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JUDGES AND LAWYERS IN AFRICA TODAY: 
THEIR POWERS COMPETENCE AND SOCIAL ROLE*
*
S iiadrhck B. O . G ltto**
1. INTRODUCTION: PUTTING “HONOURABLE JUSTICES” AND 
“LEARNED GENTLEMEN” IN HISTORICAL AND CLASS CONTEXT
Judges and legal practitioners, both public’and private, in independent 
African countries have clamoured and continue to clamour, not only for societal 
recognition and acceptance of the hallowed ideal of “independence of the 
judiciary”, but also for societal recognition and acceptance that judges and legal 
practitioners arc, and should be, collectively the custodians of justice, law and 
good order in society.
Although the central task of my contribution is to examine the independence 
of judges and lawyers through the organizational and jurisdictional aspects of 
judicial processes, I consider it fundamental to make some preliminary observa­
tions which may help us put whatever wc are doing in a correct historical and 
social context. In doing this, my purpose is to try to prove that it is socially and 
politically imperative in this period of our development that lawyers and judges 
leam to and do distinguish between the inalienable primary duty o f all o f us who 
live in class-divided societies to be consciously partisan in class struggles on the 
side of social equality, freedom and justice and the secondary but nonetheless 
important ideals of institutional and professional independence of judges and 
lawyers. The over-whelming majority of judges and lawyers in. capitalist 
societies, whether in the imperialist states, in colonics or neo-colonics, have 
tended to treat the institutional and professional independence of judges and 
lawyers as an end in itself rather than one that should be in the service of 
liberating the greater ideals of the majority of the toiling and impoverished 
masses in society. In this regard then, I consider that in reality judges and lawyers 
have been prompting theirown class ideals and not that of the larger part of 
society whom they claim to be representing.
It is in promotion of the narrowly conceived ideals of institutional and 
professional independence of the legal profession that justice was and still 
remains blindfolded. This indeed leads to serious contradictions when on the one 
hand thchuman sidcof us secs clearly that laws cannot be interpreted and applied 
outside of their social, historical and class context while on the other hand one 
yearns to promote the narrow institutional and professional ideals thatcontradict 
the former. An example which I can readily use to illustrate this point is that
* This paper was written for and presented at the joint seminar of the International 
Commission of Jurists and the African Bar Association on the Independence of the 
Judiciary and the Legal Profession in Africa, held in Lusaka, Zambia, 10th November to 
14lh November 1986.
** Lecturer, Department of Private Law, Faculty of Law, University of Zimbabwe
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which I observed in the work of the Honourable Mr. Justice E. Dumbutshena, the 
Chief Justice of Zimbabwe. In 1985 in a moving speech1, the Honourable Chief 
Justice said:
“The Courts are caught between two needs: The need to preserve . 
our natural resources and the need to do justice to society as well 
as to the offender.
What docs a magistrate do when he has been informed that the ;. 
man appearing before him has nothing to e a t . . .  The hard facts. 
arc that most people we deal with are poor peasant farmers.
Sometimes conditions of drought fall on them. They have to eat.
They arc in need of food. They need firewood and everything 
else. And they break laws which, in any event, they do not know 
or understand.
Laws cannot succeed in encouraging hungry people to starve to \ 
death in order to preserve wild animals. People will not stop 
cutting trees to get firewood if there is nothing else to make fire 
with.
To succeed in the conservation of our natural resources we must 
plan for rural economic growth. The rural population must be 
moved out of its depressing environment. There must be some­
thing to bum instead of felled trees. There must be plenty of food 
to eat. There must be sufficient money . . .
In contrast, however, the Chief Justice while asserting the right of judicial 
review of Ministerial (executive) decisions, in a recent detention case2 said:
“It is necessary to say that cases of detention involve the liberty 
of the individual, no matter who that individual is. I would like to 
repeat and thus endorse what LEON AXE J sa id . .  .’’Firstly it is 
perhaps necessary to remind oneself, from time to time that the 
first and most sacred duty o f the Court ..is  to administer justice 
to those who seek it, high and low, rich and poor, Black and 
White." (emphasis added).
What I am pointing out here is not the fact that the Chief Justice considered 
in the above case that the liberty of individuals should be safe-guarded by the 
Courts but rather thb ideology that justice ought to and can cut across social class
1 Speech by the Honourable Mr. Justice Dumbutshena, Chief Justice, delivered at the 
International Workshop on the Implementation of a National Conservation Strategy at the 
Harare Sheraton on 4 November 1985, pp.22—24.
2 The Minister of Home Affairs and the Director o f Prisons v J.V. Austin andKH. Harper, 
Judgment No. S.C.79/86, Civil Appeal No. 237/86 (unreported). (pp.24—25 of the 
cyclostyled copy of the Judgment).
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considerations while in his speech quoted above he was leaning towards 
debunking this privileged ruling class ideology in the administration of law. 
Independence of the judges and lawyers that attempts to make them blind to 
social class differentiations and how these determine justice and not the elo­
quence of arguments in court of heart-touching judgment should be exposed and 
rejected.
It is clear to me that there arc a number of historical and social factors that 
have led the mainstream of lawyers to believe in and try to institutionalize the 
concept of independence of judges and lawyers outside of social class considera­
tions.
Historically lawyers as professionals are a very recent phenomenon that date 
back to only a few centuries ago in the era of feudalism and, more so, capitalism. 
Early lawyers were members or confidants of the ruling aristocratic class. They 
were part of the rich exploiting families. The bourgeois revolution democratized 
society in tearing apart most of the feudal privileges and this led to new salaries 
or waged professionals specializing in law and its administration. A few 
members from the middle classes and even fewer from the peasantry and the 
working class joined the old lawyers from the ruling classes.
These “outsiders” became more or less privileged paid servants of the 
capitalist ruling classes. This material and social position in society dominated 
by a few wealthy people demanded that they should be “independent”, that is, 
ready to serve any capitalist and to give the capitalists equal treatment. The ideas 
and economic reasons for the development of “independence of the judiciary” 
doctrine were, therefore, tied to ideals of free competition among the capitalists 
as a class and were extended to the whole society knowing very well that the 
millions of dispossessed workers, marginalized peasants and millions of the 
unemployed had no competing chance at all.
Thus law courts and the judicial processes were commoditized — ready for 
purchase and sale with those with economic power enjoying and benefiting from 
the services of “independent” judges and lawyers. No matter how much 
philanthropicpro deos and in forma pauperises thecynical bourgeoisie and other 
honest “friends of the people” engaged in, the inequality of legal justice under 
capitalism remained, remains and will remain chained to social inequality in the 
control of production and distribution of material wealth under capitalism.3
As if the purchase of legal services arc not enough burden on the majority of 
the working and unemployed people, the content of law itself reflects and 
reinforces social inequality. Special legal language, complicated formalities, 
special procedural requirements such as rules of evidence requiring certain
3 S.B.O. Gutto, “The Political Economy of Legal Aid and Advice Services”, Z L Rev., Vol. 
' 3. 1985 (Nos. 1 and 2).
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degrees of proof and different levels of proof in criminal and civil cases, 
restrictions on parties who may participate in adjudication or disputes, threaten­
ing appearance of judges and lawyers in wigs and robes, all contribute to the 
tyranny and dictatorship over the masses. It is no wonder then that when a 
people’s revolution takes root4 and progresses,5 although under extreme hard­
ships of counter revolution engineered by imperialism, as has happened in the 
Pcoplc”s Republic of Mozambique, the land of the people’s martyr, Samora 
Machel, not only is the bourgeois controlled wealth liberated and new relations 
of production instituted, a new people-based judicial system evolves and is 
progressively consolidated.
To summarize the message of this introductory explanation, I 'quote the 
words of the revolutionary martyr Samora Machel, whom we are still mourning 
but who lives in his ideas:
“As men, as a country, as a state, we must always choose which 
side we are on: on the side of a privileged handful, with the 
people against us, or on the side of the people, with a dethroned 
privileged handful against us.”6
From purely liberal positions, scholars have now fully exposed the class role 
of the judges in advanced capitalist societies.7 To try and demand reforms to 
make them “independent” without socially transforming society is only to 
strengthen their effectiveness as agents of the minority ruling classes under 
capitalism.
It is my hope that this historical sketch will contribute towards orientating us 
to re-examine the ideological assumptions underlying the doctrine of “independ­
ence of judges and lawyers” in class divided societies so that we make the 
doctrine a tool for struggle in the service of the greater section of humanity, the 
working popular masses. We must consciously choose which side we are on for 
even if we do not do so consciously the people do and will know where we 
belong.
4 Sec, generally, A. Sachs (cd.) Principles of Revolutionary Justice (London, Mozambique, 
Angola and Guinea Information Centre, 1979).
5 Gita Ilonwana-Wclch, “Legal Pluralism in the Perspective of Popular Justice : “The 
Mozambican Experience” (unpublished paper, 1985); A. Sachs, “Changing the Tlirms of 
the Debate: A Visit toa PopularTribunal in Mozambique”, 1984, JAL, Vol.28, Nos. 1 and 
2, p.99.
6 Samora Moiscs Machel, Our Sophisticated Weapon (Maputo, Dept, of Information and 
Propaganda, 1982), p .ll.
7 Sec, for example, Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary, 2nd lid., Fontana, 1981, Paterson, 
“Judges: A Political Elite?” (1974) Vol. 1, No. 2, British Jorrnal of Law and Society, 118.
t
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2. THE HANDLING OF MATTERS OF JUDICIAL NATURE 
BY “APOLITICAL”, “PROFESSIONAL” JUDGES AND 
ORDINARY COURTS OF LAW:
WHAT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INDEPENDENCE OF JUDGES?
One of the most surprising beliefs of advocates of the traditional, as opposed 
to the revolutionary, doctrine of independence of the judiciary is that which 
views judges as “professionals” and, by implication, that judges are, therefore, 
removed or should be removed, from the political process in their work to a large 
extent. This belief ignores the reality that to a large extent judges are political 
appointees who begin their career as judges upon appointment and not by virtue 
of competitive professional examinations and job interviews. (This, to some 
extent, however, is the case in relation to judges in the lower courts, such as 
magistrates.)
In practically every other constitution of independent African countries, 
whether the constitution is inherited from the former colonizing power or is 
locally promulgated, judges at the higher lcvelsarc appointed by political leaders 
such as Presidents, Prime Ministers or Party Central Committees with or without 
the advice of Judicial Service Commissions themselves composed of political 
appointees.8 Through and through judges arc in reality creatures of politics and 
politicians and attempts through the law9 or otherwise to claim that they can, 
upon assuming their offices, distance themselves from politics are not realistic. 
The question is really that of whose politics and not whether or not they ought 
to participate in politics. Since politics is concrete expression of class struggles, 
the class in power will decide the politics of the judge. Complications do, 
however, arise where there arc multi-parties which exchange leadership every 
once in a while like we find in imperialist U.S.A., Britain, France, West 
Germany, etc. but this problem is minimized by the fact that nowhere in the world 
is thcrca situation where political parlies representing different and antagonistic 
class interests exchange leadership except under a revolution in which case the 
class in power dews not renounce its dominance willingly and peacefully.
Multi-parties representing the same class interests do cause problems for the 
judge and here some form of neutrality in Party struggles on agreed values is 
possible but nonetheless dangerous to the judge. However, a revolutionary judge 
representing the interests of the working people may work under a bourgeois 
state only as a way of using the courts to politically educate the masses and 
occasionally to undermine bourgeois interests but this cannot go on for a long 
time before the bourgeoisie discover and unleash their wrath on the judge. This 
illustrates the point that “ independence of the judges” in the revolutionary sense 
can only be possible when there is a revolution and that the traditional form of
Sec, for example, Constitution of Zimbabwe, Articles 84-85, 90.
9 See legal provisions directed at prohibiting all judicial officers from participation in 
politics in Zimbabwe : Public Service Officers (Discharge and Misconduci)(Amendincnt) 
Regulations 1985 (No. 2), S.I. 135/1985 made under Article 75 of the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe.
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“independence of the judges” is observed by the bourgeoisie only where the 
judges are seen to be promoting bourgeois values. Of course, the reverse is also 
true! Independence of the judges under socialism is conditioned by socialist 
legality and politics which arc dominated by the interests of the working people 
which are antagonistic to those of capitalism and bourgeois values.10 A judge 
with bourgeois Values cannot be elected to serve the interests of the working 
people under socialism and socialist institutions. Here we see the fundamental 
difference between socialist and capitalist judicial processes: that under social­
ism the judicial process expresses and promotes the class needs and interests of 
the majority while under cajpitalism the judicial process expresses and promotes 
the class needs and interests of the minority ruling bourgeoisie and the upper 
section of the middle-classes.
The reasons why judges depend so much on the political ruling forces are not 
only based on the fact of appointment of judges and the class values of the judges. 
Also of importance is that the enforcement of legal decisions within a state is 
assigned to organs other than the judiciary. The effectiveness of law, therefore, 
depends on unity of purpose of the judicial and executive organs of the State. 
Judicial observations in two recent Zimbabwean cases illustrate this point.
In a case where the Commissioner of Police refused to give protection to a 
messenger of court to serve a writ on squatters occupying underutilized privately 
owned land after a court ordered that they be evicted, Mr. Justice Waddington 
said:
“If the Messenger were not to be entitled to help from the police 
to give effect to writs and other process of the Courts in cases 
where he alone cannot do so, it could be quite pointless for an 
aggrieved citizen or visitor to Zimbabwe to seek the protection of 
his rights by the State through the medium of the Courts.”11
In Minister o f Home Affairs and The Director o f Prisons v J.V. Austin and 
K.N. Harper, Chief Justice Dumbutshcna said:
When the Executive ignores the orders and judgments of the 
Courts there is the inevitable break-down of law and order, 
resulting in uncivilized chaos because the courts cannot enforce 
their own orders. Their jurisdiction and duty end after the 
delivery of judgment.”12
10 V. Tcrebilov, The Soviet Court (revised cd.) (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1986) Chaps. 
1 and 2.
11 Cited with approval by Gubbay, J. A., in an appeal in The Commissioner of Police v R.S. 
Rensford and Messenger of Court, Gweru, Judgment No. S.C.30/84, Civil Appeal No. 
341/83, cyclostylcd copy (unreported) p.5.
12 Supra, note 1, p.5 of Judgment.
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3. ORDINARY COURTS, SPECIAL COURTS AND 
PROFESSIONAL JUDGES AND LAWYERS
The next area for our consideration concerns the generally assumed desira­
bility of ordinary courts presided over by “professional” judges to handle most, 
if not all, of matters of judicial nature.
Having demonstrated that the role of judges is really political and class 
determined and that, therefore, independence of the judges should be viewed in 
this context, the question whether ordinary Courts and “professionally” trained 
judges alone should be the proper organs for dispensing political and class-based 
justice is naturally contentious.
For one, it is a historical fact that most societies have, long departed, in 
■ practice, from the view that traditional law courts and judges arc the best 
institu’tipns for dispensing legal justice, or deciding fairly on disputes of a legal 
nature. The existence of institutions such as labour (industrial) relations boards 
and tribunals,13 which act as lower courts and the high courts respectively, in 
disputes between employers and workers is a clear illustration of the fact that the 
ruling classes in society have seen merit in institutions that arc generally termed 
“administrative tribunals” and that their social interests are better prompted 
through these institutions and not in ordinary courts. The movement of the 
establishment of ombudsmen,14 which obviously deal with grievances and 
disputes that could easily be dealt with by ordinary courts if the scope of 
justiciable interests were expanded further contributes to the reality that ordinary 
courts and professional judges with their narrowly conceived professional and 
institutional “independence” and “impartiality” are seriously under question.
Of course, some of the non-court disputes settlement institutions deal with 
matters that do not necessarily amount to disputes which have been lifted to the 
level of legal disputes but the point still remains that a lot of what they do could 
easily be the subject of ordinary judicial processes if the courts as currently 
constituted were viewed to be playing meaningful roles in dispute settlements.
Also of significance is the fact that in many jurisdictions, the lower courts 
where most legal disputes arc determined and finalized are not presided over by 
highly “professional” personnel. This is true of such courts during colonial rule15 
and after independence.16 The reason why lowly trained personnel decide legal 
dispute in lower courts may be partly because of financial considerations. 
However, the fact that society has come to accept this as normal and not as a 
lowering of the quality of justice illustrates the point that what is acceptable in 
society as proper is historically determined. It is not a simple professional
13 Sec, for example, Labour Relations Act, No. 16, 1985 (Zimbabwe) Paris XI and XII.
' 14 Articles 107 and 108 of Constitution ofZimbabwe and the Ombudsman Act No. 16,1982.
15 Rhodesian African Law and Tribal Courts Act, Chap. 237; Magistrate's Court Act, Chap. 
18.
j 16 Zimbabwean Customary Law and Primary Courts Act, No. 6 of 1981.
i'L
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qucs< ion although it is important that those who administer the law ought to know 
the law and the class nature of the society that law is operating in.17
What needs to be guarded against is sacrificing the less alienating character 
of judicial processes in the process of increased professionalization of the lower 
courts. We have already seen how ‘’professional” courts terrorize the masses 
through language complications, intricate procedures, intimidating appearances 
of judges etc. This should not only be corrected in the higher courts but efforts 
must be made to ensure that lower courts do not degenerate to the present levels 
of the higher courts.
More importantly, the lower courts as well as the higher courts must be 
revolutionized along with the rest of society if “independence of the judges and 
lawyers” is to mean anything positive and beneficial to the masses. There is a 
tendency at independence to try and re-discovcr the customary past and in thy 
process forget that the majority of the substances in customary laws w e rc^ jls  
based. Most societies in Africa were divided into classes (although n n w l l  '  
capitalist nature) long before formal colonization. In combatting so c ia /'e iw o i^  
tation, inequality, obscurantism, patriarchal domination, etc., etc., wfe/fVfced t e g  
deal with all forms— whether capitalist or pre-capitalist. Traditional cMgjxjmarf^ 
law and courts must not be used as centres for reviving past cxploiljfiVp antfQ 
oppressive practices. They can only play progressive roles if used to light past-i™ 
systems,of inequality and to promote the best values that are in lincWilh thef^ 
future we want to build. ' , '  s ^
Indeed, the non-court disputes settlement institutions, the ordinary courts,- 
the lay persons and the professional lawyers who sit in these institutions and 
courts can only be with the masses and for the masses when the masses have 
captured political power as they did in Mozambique18 — and become the 
ruling force in society, It is then that t he ordinary courts and special institutions 
of judicial character can reflect the needs and interests of the majority. The law 
and its administration.then becomes liberated from monopoly and direction of 
the minority exploiting classes. Independence of the judges and lawyers, who 
would then be of the people and from the people and not trained mercenaries for 
carrying out minority interests, will then be realized and respected by the people.
In other words, the organization and rc-organizalion of the courts should be 
geared towards making court fora where matters relating to the promotion of 
society’s well-being, eradication of poverty and social inequality arc being 
discussed and contradictions arising from such liberatory process resolved. This 
demands popularizing the judicial process by making judges and lawyers 
accountable to the people and also ensuring that more and more people arc 
involved in the disputes settlement process and not simply litigants, the accused
17 S.B.O. Gutto, “Law and legal education in the period of transition from capitalism to 
socialism,” Z.L. Rev., Vol I and 2, (1983-84) 158 at 166.
18 Notes 4 and 5, above.
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and prosecutors or narrowly defined witnesses as if they live outside of the 
society where they live and work. It is under such conditions that judges and 
lawyers would be independent of and from the corrupting influence of sectarian 
party politics, and dominating influence of money; primitive ideology and 
pressures for accumulation of private wealth, narrow religious dogmas and 
similar social evils.
4. COURTS, PETITIONS FOR PERSONAL FREEDOM AND 
SECURITY OF INDIVIDUALS AND THE INDEPENDENCE 
OFJUDGES AND PROSECUTORS
The ordinary courts in capitalistoricntcd African States which deal with most 
criminal cases have, by and large, used every occasion possible to assert what 
they consider to be their primary role of upholding ideals of personal freedom 
and security of individuals as well as protecting private property. It is in this 
sphere that courts and many ideologues of the traditional doctrine of independ­
ence of the judiciary have tried very much to distance the courts from the 
executive and legislative organs of the Stale, even though, as we have seen; the 
courts are themselves political creatures of those very same executive and 
legislative political organs of the Stale.
In Zimbabwe, IheHigh and Supreme Courts have since independence tended 
to interpret the law and assess situations in ways that favour individual freedom 
and protection of private properly much more than the courts did during the 
colonial time.19 So much has this tendency been expressed by the courts that a 
colleague of mine and I have commented and denounced what appeared in a 
particular ease to be deliberate promotion of imperialist and neo-colonialist 
interests of the courts.20 In one instance the Supreme Court in deciding the ease 
of a fugitive from justice even asserted that:
“Bickle, even if he were an outlaw, would be entitled to seek 
protection of the Court from the action taken against him and his 
properly.”21
The Courts in Zimbabwe have, therefore, been consistent in asserting their 
right to handle matters of judicial nature touching on personal freedom and 
security of the individual and private properly even in eases where the executive
19 John Italchard, “Breach of Constitutional Safeguards in Preventative Detention Cases”, 
'LL. Rev., Vol. 3 (1985).
20 S.B.O. Gutto and K. Makamurc, “Judicial Subversion Under the Clock of Legality? The 
Judgment in The Minister of Home Affairs v Bickle and Three Others, 7..L. Rev., Vol. 3 
(1985). (This relates to the case reported in 1984 (2) SA 439 and not that in 1983 (2) SA 
457).
21 Minister o f Home Affairs v Bickle, 1983 (2) SA 457 (ZSC) at p.464; P. Nhcrcrc, “When 
is a fugitive not a fugitive” — Some Observations on Minister of Home Affairs v Bickle”, 
Z.L. Rev., Vols. 1 and 2, (1983-84) p.267.
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arm of the State has not been pleased with22 or has proceeded to ignore,23 
sometimes justifiably, court decisions in such circumstances. The courts have 
also asserted the right of detainees to apply to court for mandamus orders on the 
detaining authority so that adequate reasons for detention arc given to the 
detainees.24 The courts have also asserted that it is their duty to ensure that the 
detaining authorities should act fairly to the detainees and that whether or not the 
executive is given discretion on the matter by the law this does not remove the 
duty of the courts to review the executive action.25
The position, adopted by the Zimbabwean courts after independence con­
trasts greatly with that taken by the Kenyan courts.26 The Kenyan courts have 
leaned more towards effecting orders from the executive organs of the State on 
how they should make decisions in eases considered “political” by political 
leaders. For example, before a trumped-up charge was abandoned and Willy 
Mutunga, the accused, was detained in 1982, Justice Sachdeva (as he then was) 
refused to give bail to the accused charged with sedition stating categorically 
before the case was heard that:
“Courts do not operate in a vacuum and cannot be oblivious of 
the fact that some subversive elements have unfortunately crept
into the University and the State cannot simply ignore them.”27
Apart from prejudging the issues, the judge conveniently ignored legal 
authorities on granting of bail submitted by the defence lawyers28 while paying 
singular attention to submissions of the prosecution — the latter simply voicing 
demands of the political leaders. Currently,, a political prisoner, Maina-Wa- 
Kinyatti, is going blind in jail despite repeated applications to the courts and 
other authorities to demand that he is given medical treatment.
From the foregoing, it becomes, clear that the relative higher level of 
independence of the judiciary in Zimbabwe compared to Kenya is useful but that 
usefulness can only be in the intcrcstof the larger society if itis not used to secure
22 See, for example, speech delivered on 1,3 July 1982. to the House of Assembly on the 
Renewal of the Slate of Emergency by the then Minister of Home Affairs, Cdc. 11. 
Ushewokunze.
23 See notes 2, 11 and 12 above. In the Rensford case (note 11) the executive organ or the 
Slate, acting under legislative powers vested in it by the legislature, promulgated 
regulations which allowed the squatters to remain on the land they had illegally occupied 
with the State paying compensation to the land owner and by so doing preserving the 
sanctity of private properly and the right of owners of private property to seek judicial 
remedies upon infringement or their property rights (Emergency Powers (Resolution or 
Disputes Over Occupation of Rural Land) Regulations, 1984, S.I. 243 A or 1984).
24 Note 2 above.
25 Supra, pp.22-24 of the cyclostylcd copy of the judgment.
26 See, generally, K. Kuria and J.B. Ojwang, “Judges and the Rule of Law in the Framework 
of Politics: The Kenyan Case”, (\919). Public Law (254-281).
21 Willy Mutunga v R (Misc. Crim. App. No. 101, 1982, High Court of Kenya at Nairobi) 
(uii reported).
28 The defence lawyers had cited the leading authority on bail, Panju v R (1973) E.A. 284.
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protection of those engaged in activities that openly expose Zimbabwe to easy 
attack by the racist, neo-fascist regime in South Africa which has a lot of 
“friends” among ex-Rhodesians, mainly but not exclusively white, who are 
Zimbabwean citizens. The Kenyan case on the other hand is sad and dangerous 
in that the courts have virtually abandoned their independence to political leaders 
who are moving more and more towards neo-colonial fascism. In both cases, 
however, the courts are carrying out their tasks in defence of the ruling classes 
and the existing capitalist economic system.
The reason why the Kenyan courts have tended to play the tune of the political 
leaders much more than the Zimbabwean courts is that in Kenya those seeking 
protection from the courts are identified as enemies of the existing neo-colonial 
capitalist economy which both the judges and the executive organs of the State 
want to preserve. So united in purpose arc the judiciary and the executive in 
Kenya on the question of suppressing progressive anti-imperialist, anti-capital­
ist resistance in any form that the executive only rarely uses preventive detention 
to silence resistance. Instead, the executive prefers to use the courts by bringing 
trumped-up charges against its intended victims.
Hundreds of Kenyans today languish in jails as political prisoners although 
the state alleges that they arc simple criminals just because their incarceration is 
sanctioned through the courts.
It is important to point out then that where courts arc not accountable to the 
popular masses there is greater danger that the courts will easily lose their 
adherence to the law and will be easily manipulalablc by political leaders bent 
on perpetuating the unacceptable social system of neo-colonialism. In such 
circumstances, attempts to use the process of habeas corpus, mandamus and 
similar processes in order to ensure that individuals arc punished only when 
clearly established cases arc proved against them in courts of law become useful 
as political education exercises only. Whenever the state rejects these processes, 
the public educates itself on the nature of the regime and if such rejection docs 
not accord with popular sentiments of the people, the regime in power gets 
rejected more and more by the people. Similarly, misuse of these processes to 
secure freedom to those bent on protecting and perpetuating the social system of 
exploitation and inequality can only bring disrepute to the courts and hence 
render independence to the judiciary a tool for promoting social and political 
injustices.
5. THE PROMOTION OF INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGES AND
LAWYERS THROUGH ENSURING FAIRNESS OF PROCEEDINGS
One of the most challenging tasks for judges and lawyers in societies 
organized along capitalist lines who arc concerned about their social relevance 
to the larger part of society who do not own and control the society’s wealth, as 
we have observed in the introduction above, is how to dispense equal justice in 
a society where inequality is institutionalized and protected by law. The dilemma 
is faced daily by lawyers who as judges, prosecutors or defenders arc caught-up
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incases where only one party in a dispute has legal representation. Can one claim 
to uphold independence that leads to equality of justice when the organization 
of the judicial process puts one in a position where they pit their professional 
legal skills against unrepresented persons? For the judge, is it possible or 
desirable to be independent in a ease where one party has legal representation 
while the other side docs not? Is it just to observe rules of judging a case purely 
on the basis of submissions by the parties to a case, whether civil or criminal, • 
where one side has specialized legal representation and the other side docs not?
It has been established beyond doubt that no j usticc is done in court where one 
party is represented by a legal professional while one side is not.29 Indeed, even 
the philanthropic efforts to provide free legal aid through sometimes disinter­
ested and poorly remunerated lawyers who arc made to face lawyers whose 
pockets are filled with money from wealthy clients do not lead to equality of 
representation.
Given these conditions it ought to be clear to all lawyers that independence 
of their profession means little or nothing at all to the majority of the society when 
all they arc doing is to demand “independence” that allows them to continue 
servicing inequality. Exercise of “independence” to serve a tiny minority in 
society is not what we should be promoting.
Indeed the only way to change and make courts and judicial processes just 
to the majority of society is to change the material conditions that create 
inequality; to restructure legal professions in such a way that private practice is 
discouraged; to make procedures and language simple and comprehensible to the 
people; to guarantee that all cases requiring legal assistance do get it; to involve 
the people in dispute settlement; to ensure that the content of law, that is, that the 
legal rights being defended, arc not for purposes of protecting any form of 
oppression.
6. CONCLUSION
I have attempted in this contribution to reveal the class basis of the assump­
tions that underlie the doctrine of independence of the judiciary and legal 
profession. In doing so I have suggested that the doctrine requires re-evaluation 
given the revolutionary demands of the masses in our societies who have 
suffered for centuries under colonial capitalism and who, since independence, 
continue to suffer under neo-colonial capitalism that prevails in most of our 
societies in Africa. The capitalist system commoditizes virtually all material 
goods and social services. And, legal services have not been an exception.
Without undertaking major transformations in material conditions, institu­
tions and ideological orientation, our quest for independence of judges and
29 See, Gutto, Note 3, above; J.S. Read, “The Advantage of Counsel" (1971) Vol. 7(2) East 
African Law Journals'. Ilwacha, Report on Legal Aid in Zimbabwe, 1983 (unpublished).
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lawyers can only mean independence to allow the anti-society work of lawyers 
to be perpetuated. The minority ruling class, however, arc benefiting from the 
existing order of things and will necessarily oppose our efforts to join the masses 
and create new, more socially beneficial, conditions in the law and its admini­
stration. However, as Samora Machcl said, we must choose which side we are 
on. I have chosen which side I am on and I have made my contribution from that 
partisan position. •
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